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abstract
This article pursues an antihermeneutic conception of Socratic irony that troubles 
the borders between pedagogical authority and humility. One of the most tenacious 
ways of troping the teacher-student relation, Socratic irony is often figured as a way 
for a masterful teacher to exercise authority over a student. Drawing on the writ-
ings of Søren Kierkegaard and Avital Ronell, this article repositions such irony as 
an uncontrollability in language itself—one that can humble and humiliate teacher 
and student alike. Via divergent readings of Plato’s Gorgias and Aristophanes’ 
Clouds, as well as Bruno Latour’s interpretation of the former, I question how this 
approach to Socratic irony might re- and unwork rhetoricians’ positions of mastery 
with regard to both students and systematized bodies of knowledge.
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introduction
Let us count, rather, on disarray.
—Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster
Perhaps “since the beginning of time” is an inauspicious way to begin a 
composition. And yet, given the project I am undertaking, it does not seem 
too far off. Let us say this: from the very start of the pedagogical  tradition 
associated with Western rhetoric, which is often represented as  having 
its roots in ancient Greece, the figure of the rhetoric teacher has had a 
remarkably fraught relationship with cultural and political authority. Just 
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consider the double legacy of Socrates as both—on one hand—the West’s 
original wise man, a revered and beloved pedagogue, and—on the other—a 
bothersome wise guy and disruptive corrupter of youth.1 In Aristophanes’ 
Clouds, which positions Socrates as a sophist rather than a philosopher, he 
even comes across as a bit of a huckster. Or consider Against the Sophists, in 
which Isocrates argues that “sophists” are driven by a “desire for . . . profit” 
and have a deservedly “bad reputation among the general public” even as he 
advertises his own program of rhetorical education (2000, 61–62). Later in 
his career, Isocrates positions himself as a man of humble means (Antidosis 
155), an adjunct of the “leisured” class whose students left his care “with 
regret and tears” (213, 221).
These tensions between humility and authority, between masterful 
 wisdom and pretentious chicanery, were also commonplace during classical 
Rome’s Second Sophistic. Even as rhetorical education received a degree 
of imperial recognition and sanction, “the rhetorician’s school” remained 
“a small, and in many cases precarious, business” (Walker 2011, 4). Libanius, 
“who held the municipal chair of rhetoric in Antioch” (2011, 161), con-
ceives of the rhetorician as a second father to his students, with “a student’s 
dependence on and closeness to his teacher . . . produc[ing] mutual feelings 
of affection” (Cribiore 2007, 139). At the same time, however, he complains 
of inadequate funding as well as disrespectful students who despise their 
instructors and threaten to take their parents’ money elsewhere at the first 
hint of disciplinary action (Walker 2011, 161).2
In short, rhetoric teachers were both revered and reviled, positioned as 
authoritative yet humble masters as well as effete deceivers with their heads 
in the clouds and hands in their students’ purses. Their authority as sur-
rogate father figures was transient and constantly destabilized by parents, 
parodists, pupils—even by fellow teachers with whom they competed for 
students and funds. Raffaella Cribiore (2001) notes that “accusing someone 
of being a schoolteacher, or of having a schoolteacher as a father, was a 
common insult” (59). For ancient and classical teachers, the challenge was 
to restabilize their authority by situating themselves as adjuncts to but not 
members of the leisured class, leveling invective at their competitors while 
winning both the devotion of students and support of political and cultural 
authorities.
In subtly similar ways, contemporary teachers of rhetoric and  writing 
also experience these tensions: for every movie about an adept writing 
teacher who inspires a class of students to change themselves and the world, 
there is a comedy featuring an absent-minded professor who can barely 
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manage a piece of chalk. And while colleges and universities afford some 
teachers a much greater degree of professional stability than the  precarious 
businesses of their classical forerunners, the increasing adjunctification of 
higher education in general and rhetoric and writing in particular leaves 
many teachers in a distinctly marginal position (Crowley 1998, 118).
But while the outrageous financial situations faced by adjunct and 
contingent teachers are surprisingly similar to those faced by Libanius’s 
contemporaries, the antinomies of pedagogical authority resonate quite 
differently for many present-day teachers of rhetoric than they did for clas-
sical predecessors. Many of today’s teachers hold ethical concerns about 
authority relations between teachers, students, and broader institutions and 
structures that did not trouble ancient teachers. Consider Sharon Crowley’s 
warning that “classical rhetorical theory was devised a long time ago in 
cultures that were rigidly classbound” and “invented for the use of privi-
leged men” (1998, 264). If the struggle for classical teachers was stabilizing 
an ethos of pedagogical authority reliant on and defined by rigidly patri-
archal and class-bound (if occasionally democratic) systems—systems in 
which the goal was to turn out students prepared to inhabit and/or pro-
tect similarly rigid systems—then what are rhetoricians suspicious of such 
systems to do? How are we to negotiate our own authority if we wish to 
resist a model of education designed to “produce a professional manage-
rial class schooled in the art of obedience to authority and accepting of 
dominator-based hierarchy” (hooks 2003, 20)? Put otherwise, how might 
we teach our student bodies—no longer just male, no longer constituting a 
homogeneous cultural, ideological, or socioeconomic milieu—to question 
structural authority without abdicating our own pedagogical authority or 
participating in the denigration of teachers as ethically and intellectually 
suspect, as parasites (a denigration that persists in overwrought attacks on 
“radical” humanities professors, as well as much of the discourse surround-
ing education reform and the defunding of public education)?
In this article, I explore these questions by going back to the start,  taking 
up a tricky trope (or perhaps not a trope) that has haunted the Western 
pedagogical tradition since its inception: Socratic irony. I argue that this 
trope, which troubles the borders of authority and humility, wisdom and 
stupidity, constitutes a fertile topos from which to trace out ethically and 
intellectually responsible approaches to pedagogical and rhetorical “author-
ity.” Rather than going right to Socratic irony, however, let me spend a 
moment dwelling with irony more generally, a “trope” that has— historically, 
practically, and conceptually—troubled quite a few borders of its own. 
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I will recall this stopover with irony as I go on to examine iterations of 
Socrates in the works of various rhetoricians, philosophers, and theorists. 
From there, I will tease out a lengthy consideration of Plato’s Gorgias, ques-
tioning the rhetorical and figural stability of that text’s Socrates. Then I will 
turn to Bruno Latour’s reading of the Gorgias, chase that with a look at 
Aristophanes’ Clouds, and subsequently argue that these texts serve to befog 
further both Socrates’ fractured figurations and the irony that those figura-
tions so frequently claim does not characterize Socratic discourse. I end 
with some inconclusive conclusions that hitch these conceptual and figural 
concerns to the pedagogical situations faced by contemporary rhetoricians.
irony: a brief word
What is irony? A stupid question if ever there was one, but perhaps my 
inescapable starting point. It is, after all, what one might call a Platonic 
question, and Socratic irony of course owes much of its historical legacy 
to Plato.3 I position this question as “Platonic” insofar as it presumes that 
“irony” has some essence characterized by fixed, generalizable qualities 
toward which one can gesture. Tying irony to constative meanings and 
fixed qualities entails certain difficulties, however (de Man 1996, 164). In 
many ways, it is easier to describe what irony does than it is to say what irony 
is. It is easier, in other words, to speak about it in performative terms, which 
leads to an odd paradox: if irony is anything, it is what it does—that is, it 
“is” performative—and so maybe does not have any substantial, substantive 
identity at all.4 As Avital Ronell observes, nothing puts one at risk of ironic 
effacement like trying to exert ironic authority or pronounce authoritatively 
on irony (2002, 128–29). In “The Rhetoric of Testing,” a chapter in a book 
called Stupidity, Ronell writes,
Often the decisive interventions on the part of irony bear effects 
of physicality; they give a sound beating to a language that closes 
in on itself. . . . Like Socrates, it functions as gadfly, as an internal 
allergen that appears to come from a place of exteriority, undo-
ing all transcendental systems, constantly rewriting the text that 
it submits to endless retests, retaking acknowledged premises on a 
permanent basis. This is why irony is no joke. (2002, 156)
In what follows, then, I resist Platonic attempts to define “irony” and 
“Socratic irony” and instead follow in the footsteps of those who have 
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approached irony more haltingly, more attentive to its predilection to make 
you play the fool—though surely I will fall down on the job at least once or 
twice. In all, I position “what is irony?” as a Platonic question that is impos-
sible to answer definitively and—recalling Ronell—set up the rest of this 
article as “antihermeneutic.” Ronell ends “The Rhetoric of Testing” with 
what must be one of the twenty-first century’s most open-ended “tests,” 
one constituted by such items as “What is the relationship between stu-
pidity and unintelligibility?” and “Show how Friedrich Schlegel’s antiher-
meneutics of friendship illuminates what Blanchot and Derrida have to 
say about the politics of friendship” (2002, 162, emphasis mine). These test 
questions in some ways frame the (perhaps stupid) task I am undertaking 
and undergoing here. This task might be glossed as a tracing of the rela-
tionship between pedagogy and irony, as well as irony’s antihermeneutic 
implications for the politics of pedagogical relations.5 While hermeneutic 
approaches to Socratic pedagogy and irony might aim for “understanding” 
and interpretations grounded in stabilized meanings and authorial inten-
tions, I position my approach as “antihermeneutic” because I set out expect-
ing the unexpected: that the borders of concepts, theories, practices, and 
disciplines will blur in curious ways (although I do not assume that my 
expectations will guarantee any meaningful transcendence or ironic refixing 
of such borders).6 Contrast this project, if you will, with Iakovos Vasiliou’s 
(2002) “Socrates’ Reverse Irony.” Via sharp readings of Plato’s Apology and 
Gorgias, Vasiliou pinpoints a “trope” he calls “reverse irony” and concludes 
that “recognizing reverse irony is important for understanding Socrates’ 
method. . . . [It] is . . . an expedient and efficient means of generating per-
plexity” (230). Meanwhile I, via a dull reading of the Gorgias and a handful 
of other texts, am stuck on what happens when neither the interlocutor, nor 
the reader, nor the Socratic figure “walk away . . . from a Socratic discus-
sion believing that he [isn’t it always?] has the sort of expert knowledge of 
a virtue that would reliably enable him to pick out instances of that virtue” 
(225). I set out expecting to get buffeted and buffaloed by irony “constructed 
as the rhetorical test site par excellence” (Ronell 2002, 121), poised to fall 
into yet another trope that Vasiliou names early on: “that most Socratic of 
all results: aporia” (221).
figures of socrates
I try to hold open the preceding questions about “irony” as I consider the 
proceeding questions: What is Socratic irony, and (how) can one think about 
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it while avoiding or working around precisely that Platonic question? Does 
the Socratic pedagogue use or get used by irony? Given the “effects of 
physicality” that Ronell attributes to irony, is a Socratic irony that does 
not do violence to students, teachers, and their languages desirable and/or 
possible? And, all told, might such questions lead us to rethink the author-
ity relations between students, teachers, language systems, and knowledge? 
None of these, I do not think, are yes-or-no questions.
In contemporary parlance, however, what is often glossed as “Socratic 
irony” or the “Socratic method” depends almost entirely on yes-or-no ques-
tions, or at least on questions enclosed within systems that programmati-
cally delimit what counts as a “right” or “wrong” answer: Platonic idealism, 
the American legal code—even standardized tests might fit the bill here 
(see Latour 1997, 224).7 Whether the goal is Truth, a law degree, or a high 
GRE score, the deep unpleasantness of such systems—from the unenviable 
rhetorical position of Plato’s Socrates’ yes men to modern students tossing 
and turning the night before a big multiple-choice test—is unquestionable. 
Within these systems’ more traditional iterations, the author (e.g., Plato) 
or other authority figure (e.g., the College Board) has presumably mastered 
the system’s contents and method, and any apparent lack of knowledge on 
the part of that masterful, authoritative figure is pure dissemblance. This is a 
further limiting of the conception of “the Socratic” offered by Yun Lee Too: 
the erotic teacher, she argues—Socrates being in her estimation one such 
teacher—is “one who temporarily stages the scene of intellectual resource-
lessness, whether actual or feigned, . . . such that lack of knowledge remains 
specific to the pedagogical scenario and stands apart from any actual inad-
equacy that the student may feel” (2000, 76). Contra Too, contemporary 
conceptions and deployments of “Socratic irony” both position the master’s 
staging of “intellectual resourcelessness” as always “feigned” and—whether 
purposefully or accidentally—seem to excel at feeding students’ feelings of 
anxious “inadequacy.”
Such discursive systems may claim to proceed in a “Socratic” man-
ner, but a number of their critics have positioned Plato as their progenitor. 
Michel Foucault puts it like this: “In every society the production of dis-
course is at once controlled, selected, organized, and redistributed accord-
ing to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and 
its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome 
materiality” (1982, 217).8 Foucault then elaborates on three such “procedures”: 
prohibited speech, the division of reason and folly (which I bracket here, 
though folly and irony often run in the same circles), and the opposition 
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between “true” and “false” discourse (218). He is particularly interested in 
the latter, which he blames on Plato. Foucault claims that Plato’s exclu-
sion of the sophists instantiated the true/false opposition by relegating dis-
course to its “said” form and attempting to sunder all links to the allure of 
its “saying.” Foucault’s powerful, desirous “saying” resonates with Gorgias’s 
“Encomium of Helen.” In the encomium—which Gorgias describes as a 
“paignion” (amusement or plaything) that aims to “free the accused [i.e., 
Helen] from blame” (Gorgias 2007, 256, 252)—the famous sophist describes 
“speech” as “a powerful lord that with the smallest and most invisible body 
accomplishes most godlike works” (253).
Foucault might thus point to Plato’s Gorgias as a key moment in the 
incarceration of the sophists and sophistic sayings. Near the start of the 
dialogue (449c), Plato’s Socrates requests that Gorgias stick to “the short 
style of speech, and leave the long style for some other time” (Plato 1987, 5). 
Plato’s Gorgias obliges, at least initially, replying with the one-word yes-or-
no answers so typical of Plato’s Socrates’ interlocutors.
Given that I am on the trail of Socratic irony, however, let me note 
two complications before I play around with the Gorgias in the “long style.” 
First, despite Plato’s singular influence on contemporary perceptions of 
Socrates, we have at least two other accounts that confound his portrait: 
Xenophon’s and Aristophanes’. Søren Kierkegaard elaborates on and com-
pares these views at the start of The Concept of Irony. Despite confessing a 
“perhaps somewhat youthful infatuation with Plato” (1989, 25), Kierkegaard 
is not entirely dismissive of Xenophon, “a second-rate fellow were it not 
for the chinks in his presentation” (27). These presentational gaps have 
to do with Plato’s and Xenophon’s respective approaches to irony, which 
Kierkegaard touches on in a footnote: “The ironic in Xenophon is never 
the floating of irony blissfully resting in itself but is a means of education, 
therefore at times encouraging to those from whom Socrates is actually 
expecting something” (25). For Kierkegaard, the “education” provided by the 
Socrates of Xenophon’s dialogues is a “utilitarian” reinscription of Greek 
cultural commonplaces. Meanwhile Plato, Kierkegaard’s dreamy crush, uses 
Socratic irony to transcend such commonness.
But even the infatuated Kierkegaard does not give Plato the last 
word on irony, turning from Xenophon to Plato to the comic playwright 
Aristophanes. He positions the Socrates of Aristophanes’ Clouds as “just 
the necessary contrast to Plato’s. . . . Indeed, it would be a great lack if we 
did not have the Aristophanic appraisal of Socrates; for just as every parody 
is an assurance that this process has outlived its day, so the comic view 
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is an element, in many ways a perpetually corrective element, in making 
a personality or an enterprise completely intelligible” (128). The notion of 
rendering something “completely intelligible” might seem inimical to my 
proclaimed antihermeneutic approach to irony. After all, Ronell, reading 
Schlegel, associates irony with unintelligibility (2002, 146). That Kierkegaard 
positions the “comic view” as a “perpetually corrective element,” however, 
suggests that for Kierkegaard, “complete” intelligibility is always a work in 
progress. The Concept’s next sentence frustrates intelligibility even further: 
“Even though we lack direct evidence about Socrates, even though we lack 
an altogether reliable view of him, we do have in recompense all the various 
nuances of misunderstanding, and in my opinion this is our best asset with a 
personality such as Socrates” (128, emphasis mine). If Kierkegaard is claim-
ing Aristophanes makes Socrates “completely intelligible,” then, it is only 
insofar as the playwright rounds out a gallery of misunderstandings, adding 
another shady character to a lineup of unusual subjects. For Kierkegaard, 
laying Plato’s, Xenophon’s, and Aristophanes’ characterizations beside or 
on top of each other reveals not a full picture of Socrates but “the cryptic 
nothing that actually constitutes the point in Socrates’ life” (153), a lack that 
constitutes Socrates’ core.
This view resonates with Ronell’s take on irony, but runs contrary to 
those who would either (a) valorize Socrates as the progenitor or mouth-
piece of earnest Platonic doctrines, or (b) critique Socrates as a figure who 
uses irony as a mode of straightforward dissemblance, as a duplicitous trap 
deployed to flip the script on relativistic wise guys.9 This brings me back to 
the second complication I promised a few paragraphs ago: Plato’s Socrates 
is already fragmented. This is well established in the traditional subdividing 
of Plato’s dialogues into early, middle, and late. As Donald J. Zeyl notes, 
“The Gorgias is generally considered the be one of the last of Plato’s early 
dialogues and so is often thought to represent the views, methods, and 
personality of the historical Socrates” (1987, xii). In what follows, I give 
this screw one more turn, claiming that even within the discrete text called 
the Gorgias, interlocutors and readers encounter a patchwork Socrates 
written by a multivalent Plato who shifts views and methods in a manner 
that troubles not only a unified conception of “the Socratic” but the bor-
der between “Socratic” and “sophistic.” While many scholars in philosophy 
and rhetoric position “the quarrel between Gorgias and Plato” as presag-
ing modern debates about the relative intellectual merits of rhetoric and 
philosophy (Hauser 2004, 40), I explore this “quarrel” as a way to—perhaps 
ironically—question the lines not only between “Socratic” and “sophistic,” 
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but also between such other pairs as philosophy and rhetoric, student and 
teacher, and eiron and alazon.10 So let us fall into the “cryptic nothing” of 
the Gorgias, probing some potentially unintelligible moments in the text.
some views made (im)possible: interrupting the 
GORGIAS
In the Gorgias, Socrates debates the nature, qualities, and political merits 
of rhetoric with three primary interlocutors. First up is the sophist and 
orator Gorgias, who has just finished giving “an admirable, varied presen-
tation” (Plato 1987, 1). Gorgias is followed by two of his admirers: Polus 
and Callicles. Some readers of the dialogue—Bruno Latour, for instance—
describe Socrates as “defeat[ing]” these interlocutors “one after the other: 
Gorgias, a bit tired from the lecture he has just given; Polus, a bit slow; and 
finally the harshest of the three, the famous and infamous Callicles” (1997, 
192). I will return to Latour’s reading, but for now pause only to note that 
“defeat” may be too strong a word. Zeyl, for instance, claims that “Polus 
is reduced to silence (but not to consent) and retires from the discussion” 
(1987, xiii, emphasis mine). It is also worth noting that Polus seems to enter 
the dialogue by interrupting, jumping in before Gorgias can reply to one of 
Socrates’ rejoinders and doing so with a frustrated, flustered, and syntacti-
cally fractured utterance that begins, “Really, Socrates?” (31). It thus seems 
questionable whether Gorgias is overcome by an antagonist or pushed aside 
by a would-be ally.
Until Polus’s interjection, in fact, Gorgias seems comfortable playing 
along with Socrates, the only one of the interlocutors who seems to take 
any delight in the proceedings (449c; 505c). Though Socrates later enjoins 
Callicles not to “jest” (“paizein”) (77), Gorgias—who, as we have seen in the 
“Encomium of Helen,” has a fondness for playthings (Gorgias 1987, 256)—
seems to approach the affair with significantly less exasperation than his 
followers. Again, then: that Gorgias is “defeated” seems questionable.
Callicles, like Polus and unlike Gorgias, enters the conversation with 
an expression of disbelief (481b). After Socrates claims that suffering injus-
tice is better than doing it, Callicles turns to Socrates’ friend Chaerephon 
and asks, “Is Socrates in earnest about this or is he joking [paizei]?” (51). 
Callicles repeats the question to Socrates himself, who does not offer a 
direct answer. It is not until a bit later in their conversation that Socrates 
directly denies that he is dissembling (489d–e). After he asks Callicles to 
“go easier on me in your teaching, so that I won’t quit your school” (61), 
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Callicles replies, “You’re being ironic [eirōneuēi], Socrates” (61).11 Socrates 
dismisses the charge and turns it back on Callicles: “No I’m not, Callicles, 
by Zethus—the character you were invoking in being ironic with me so 
often just now!” (61).
Whether Socrates’ inversion of Callicles’ accusation is itself ironic, how-
ever, remains unclear. After all, despite his claim to earnestness, Socrates 
seems subtly playful if not utterly stupid when it comes to following the 
rhetorical rules he himself establishes for the dialogue. Take his request that 
Gorgias stick to “the short style of speech [braxulogias], and leave the long 
style [makrologias] for some other time” (5). Gorgias, adaptable sophist that 
he is, consents and delivers. Socrates, however, violates his own precepts 
and speaks at greater length than any of his interlocutors. He is not entirely 
unaware of this twist, offering Polus the following justification:
Perhaps I’ve done an absurd thing: I wouldn’t let you make long 
speeches, and here I’ve just composed a lengthy one myself. 
I deserve to be forgiven, though, for when I made my statements 
short you didn’t understand and didn’t know how to deal with the 
answers I gave you, but you needed a narration. So if I don’t know 
how to deal with your answers either, you must spin out a speech, 
too. But if I do, just let me deal with them. That’s only fair. (26)
In addition to troubling the limits of his self-imposed stylistic restric-
tions, Socrates is also slippery about what constitutes an admissible proof. 
Still speaking with Polus, Socrates says, “Whereas everyone but me agrees 
with you, you are all I need, although you’re just a party of one, for your 
agreement and testimony. It’s you alone whom I call on for a vote; the oth-
ers I disregard  ” (42, emphasis mine). Just before he makes this claim, how-
ever, Socrates pursues a different line of argument by asking, “Now didn’t 
the majority [pollós] of mankind [anthropos], and you earlier, agree with us 
that doing what’s unjust is more shameful than suffering it?” (41). Polus 
concurs, giving Socrates the assent of the only one that the gadfly claims 
to  care about, but Socrates’ subsequent claim that he “disregard[s]” the 
“others” (“alius”) is already undercut by this apparent appeal to a great deal 
of “others”—“the majority”—that precedes his rejection of such appeals’ 
legitimacy. Perhaps this is a playful demonstration that he can, by appeal-
ing to the pollós, beat Polus at his own game—that the “philosopher” is in 
fact better than the rhetor and/or sophist at winning over both the one 
and the many. If it is such a demonstration, however, it only contributes to 
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the ironic undecidability of the dialogue, opening the question of whether 
we can trust Socrates’ claims to earnestness in a dialogue in which he is 
ironically granted precisely the persuasive powers he projects onto the 
rhetor (cf. 455a). Perhaps we could work around this problem by reading 
the appeal to the pollós of anthropos as an appeal to human nature (rather 
than majority opinion), which Plato’s Socrates thus does not see as conflict-
ing with the suspicion he expresses toward the demos during his exchange 
with Callicles (481d). At the very least, however, this would then seem to 
validate Callicles’ claim that Socrates is “slyly” manipulating the distinction 
between “terms of nature” (“physis”) and “terms of law” (“nomos”) for his 
own benefit (483a), again throwing into question Socrates’ status as eiron 
and/or alazon. Who knows?
I am posing the question “Who knows?” not as a rhetorical question—
at least in the usual sense of “rhetorical question.” I ask it not to foreclose 
response but in order to explore some compossible responses. More specifi-
cally, the question is this: in the case of the Gorgias, who knows if and/or 
when Socrates is dissembling, ironically breaking his own rhetorical rules 
(on style, arrangement, invention—we could blast away with all five can-
ons of rhetoric and more), and how do the fuzzy boundaries of that “who” 
delimit the dialogue’s rhetorical-pedagogical significance? Furthermore, 
how might this question complicate our sense of who is reading and who is 
 getting read, who is teaching and who is learning, who is the sophist and who is 
the philosopher, who is the eiron and who is the alazon, over the course of 
the dialogue? Some possibilities:
1. One could take the fairly traditional view that Plato knows and 
that he means for his Socrates to know as well. In other words, 
the author and his speaker are unified in understanding when and 
whether they’re being ironic. We could take this to mean that a wise 
and wily Plato is deploying a similarly clever Socrates to outfox 
the sophists and thus prove philosophy’s essential superiority. This 
would mean Callicles does not get it—that he asks whether Socrates 
is being ironic due to a sincere lack of understanding. In this case, 
it could even be Socrates’ very sincerity that renders him the ironic 
master and Callicles the unwitting student: having “abandoned any 
hope of educating his listeners,” he utilizes a “reverse irony,” speak-
ing sincerely in the understanding that those hapless listeners will 
be unable to hear his earnest views as anything other than ironic 
(Vasiliou 2002, 226). In such a reading, Socrates becomes either the 
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eiron whose mastery never slips or the alazon whose simple wisdom 
topples Callicles, the pretentious eiron.
2. Perhaps Plato, Socrates, and the interlocutors are in on it: Plato 
and his Socrates are playing a game with rather than at the expense 
of Callicles, Polus, and Gorgias. In this case, we can perhaps take 
the dialogue as one of the written “amusements” Plato’s Socrates 
describes in the Phaedrus (1995, 82). Socrates is jesting with Callicles 
when he asks him not to jest, Callicles is just jesting back, Gorgias is 
having a good time in the margins rather than growing incensed at 
the philosopher’s insults (e.g., 462a), and so on. Such a reading might 
resonate not only with the Phaedrus, which is typically classified as 
one of Plato’s middle dialogues, but also with George Kennedy’s 
claim that in the “early dialogues” both Plato and his Socrates were, 
like Gorgias, “probably content to encourage debate and suspend 
final judgment” (1994, 20). It would also mesh with Plato’s Seventh 
Letter, in which the writer claims that of the “truth” of the matters 
with which he concerns himself “no treatise by me concerning it 
exists or ever will exist” (1973, 136).12 We could shuffle the deck here 
a bit, presuming Gorgias is amused while Callicles and Polus are 
bemused (see Callicles at 505c and 521b), or that Polus alone is left 
out in the cold.
3. Perhaps Plato gets it but means to situate everyone on the “inside” of 
the dialogue, Socrates included, as alazons. Imagine that Plato, like 
the writer of a sitcom episode, sets his characters off into a web of 
scrambled messages and miscommunications, with the supernatural 
“account” (“logos”) at the dialogue’s end intended not as metaphysi-
cal Truth, but as a means of rebuilding camaraderie in the wake of so 
many flared tempers (523a). In this case, the dialogue’s “lesson” might 
be similar to one that concludes another of Plato’s early dialogues: 
at the end of the Lysis, the characters’ failed attempt to find a stable 
and coherent philosophy of friendship is precisely what turns them 
into bosom buddies (223b).
4. Moreover, one could switch pop-culture idioms and build on 
Ronell’s description of Plato’s MO: “Like the survivor of so many 
police films, Plato was set off by the murder of his partner” (2012, 9). 
Imagine Plato, after so many years on the beat, retired from his job 
policing the borders of the political, rhetorical, and philosophical. 
Finally understanding that—in the end—there is nothing to under-
stand, he turns to writing dialogues that prefigure film noir scripts. 
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In this case, perhaps it is Plato’s Callicles who gets it; in this reading, 
Callicles’ ominous, pragmatic warnings to Socrates—that clueless 
idealist—have the same function as the last line of Chinatown (1999): 
“Forget it, Socrates. It is the agora” (see the allusions to Socrates’ trial 
at 521c). Plato’s posthumous lesson: give up trying to track down 
transcendent truth—just look where that got my partner. No eirons 
or alazons here—just us nihilists.
5. Additionally, one could invert the previous option, questioning 
intentionality by positioning Socrates as the eiron and Plato as the 
clueless alazon who never gets it. Imagine Socrates, in other words, 
shouting some lesson from the pages that the writer is somehow 
missing. Plato, following Socrates around and frantically marking 
down the teacher’s words, misses the point or lack thereof. He is, 
like one of Kafka’s versions of Abraham, “the class dummkopf . . . too 
dumb to know that he cannot be the smart one beckoned forth on 
this day” (Ronell 2002, 292). Perhaps the “smart one” is Aristophanes, 
about whom more in a bit, and perhaps he is the smart one because 
(option 5b) he realizes that Plato and Socrates are both hot-air 
buffoons.
6. Finally, though not exhaustively, we could question whether the 
reader is supposed to get it, whether the dialogue has any didactic 
or dialectical end. Reiterating Socrates’ comments on writing in the 
Phaedrus, we could question whether Plato intends—though here 
we would again hit the limits of intentionality—for his writings to 
communicate anything to anyone else, or whether he is just “storing 
up reminders for himself ‘when he reaches forgetful old age’” (1995, 
82). Is there any intended lesson for the Gorgias’s recipients, or is it 
just a cryptic entry in Plato’s diary?
Who knows? Who ironizes and who’s ironized? Who’s learned and 
who learns? These myriad troubled interpretations also trouble such cat-
egorizations: every party involved “could swing on either side of the bound-
ary,” not only via oscillations over time but via simultaneous doublings—a 
laughing at oneself that could be clever and/or stupid (Ronell 2002, 298).
an additional impossibility
The possibilities I just suggested—their proliferation gesturing toward the 
relative impossibility of ascribing one fixed meaning to the Gorgias—may 
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seem too playful. Not only might I have ignored or misunderstood Socrates’ 
request that his interlocutors refrain from jesting (500b), but perhaps I need 
to remind myself of Ronell’s (2002) claim that “irony is no joke” (156). 
Or perhaps playfulness is a way to resist slipping into flippancy. Perhaps 
I might otherwise end up like the “family of theoreticians” Derrida (1988) 
takes and sends up in Limited Inc:
The more they seek to produce serious utterances, the less they 
can be taken seriously. It is up to them whether they will take 
advantage of this opportunity to transform infelicity into delight 
[jouissance]. For example, by proclaiming: everything that we have 
said-written-done up to now was not really serious or strict; it was 
all a joke: sarcastic, even a bit ironic, parasitical, metaphorical, 
citational, cryptic, fictional, literary, insincere, etc. (72, translator’s 
brackets)
To expand on and test the limits of this playfulness, let us bounce  it 
off the serious concerns Bruno Latour (1997) raises in his reading of 
the  Gorgias: “Socrates’ and Callicles’ Settlement; or, The Invention of 
the Impossible Body Politic.”13 For Latour, all the figures in and around 
the Gorgias are in on this “settlement,” the consequences of which are no 
joke for the demos. In his reading, the differences between Socrates and “the 
straw Callicles”—whom Latour opposes to “the positive, or the historical, 
or the anthropological Callicles” (194)—only disguise a broader agreement: 
“the simple fact that they all wish to stand alone against the people” (198). 
Socrates and Callicles’ shadowboxing diverts attention from “a second fight 
going on silently, offstage, pitting the people of Athens, the ten thousand 
fools, against Socrates and Callicles, allied buddies, agreeing on everything 
and differing only about the swiftest means to silence the crowd” (208). 
Rather than displacing straw Callicles’ claim that it is only natural for “the 
better man and the more capable man to have a greater share than the worse 
man and the less capable man” (Plato 1987, 54), Latour sees the dialogue’s 
proceedings as recruiting “Force,” “Reason,” “Morality,” “Knowledge,” and 
“Power” in the service of Plato’s united Socrates and Callicles and thus 
against the demos: “Professor Socrates writes on the blackboard his trium-
phant equation: Politics plus absolute morality minus practical means equals 
the Impossible Body Politic” (231). In Latour’s reading, Plato’s Socrates’ 
equation is a “political weapon” and “war cry” deployed to issue this com-
mand: “Keep your mouth shut!” (233). Latour forwards an alternative model 
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of deliberation that, though primarily focused on scientific argument, he 
positions as also relevant to the sorts of social and political controversies 
addressed in the Gorgias. It is a discussion-dependent model he aligns with 
extending access, “through experiments and calculations, to entities that do 
not at first have the same characters as humans” (233).
Latour sees his alternative as “the best and fastest way to free  science 
from politics” and ironically argues that it finds its “clearest” definition in the 
Gorgias. Who offers this definition? According to Latour, it is “Socrates—
and here I want to . . . make amends for having ironized so much at the 
expense of this master of irony” (235). Latour quotes the following lines 
from the Socrates of Plato’s Gorgias: “In fact, Callicles, the experts’ opin-
ion is that co-operation, love, order, discipline, and justice bind heaven and 
earth, gods and men. That’s why they call the universe an ordered whole, my 
friend, rather than a disorderly mess or an unruly shambles [kai to olon touto 
dia tauta kosmon kalousin, ô etaire, ouk akosmian oude akolasian]” (quoted in 
Latour 235, emphasis and brackets his).14
Latour uses this quote to spin out a valorous agenda for scientific and 
social deliberation, “the task being to turn this collective [i.e., both humans 
and nonhuman ‘entities’] into a ‘cosmos’ instead of an ‘unruly shambles’” (234). 
This task, Latour argues, refuses the pernicious “acceleration” of  scientific dog-
matism and antidemocratic Platonism: “It has now been shown that instead 
of simply adding order,” such acceleration “adds disorder as well” (238). He 
draws a link between his decelerated style of deliberation and “the condi-
tions of felicity for the slow creation of a consensus in the harsh conditions 
of the agora” (237), conditions that he hopes will allow controversies to be 
repositioned as “between ‘unruly shambles’ and ‘cosmos’” rather than between 
“descendants of Socrates” and “descendants of Callicles” (238).15
But, as someone who is constantly undone by the “tropologically inse-
cure nature of irony” (Ronell 2002, 121), let me offer a messy defense of the 
“unruly shambles.” The agora may be preferable to the exclusive violence 
of a politics powered by tyrannical capitals: Force, Reason, Knowledge, 
etc. Nevertheless, the agora was quite adept at instituting exclusions of its 
own: women, slaves, non-Greeks, and gadflies all fared pretty poorly in its 
“harsh conditions.” Though I find much to admire about the dissemination 
of access that Latour advances, I hesitate when he links it to an “ordered 
whole.” In pursuit of such a totality, Latour claims, “no shortcuts are pos-
sible, no short-circuits, and no acceleration.” His pursuit of “order” pro-
ceeds slowly and carefully, then, but remains tied to a certain set of ends 
that seem to resonate too readily with—were we to read the Gorgias in/as 
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earnest—Socrates’ obsession with all things “orderly” (see 454c, 493c, 506d). 
I wonder whether one might instead linger and wander among the sham-
bles, perhaps accounting for the inevitability of a different class of “short-
circuits” (of understanding, of reason, of order itself ) that so often lead to 
reactionary violence against those slapped with the label of “disorder”—
those shambling along too slowly to keep up with even the decelerated 
pace of the agora. I would ask, in short, how we might resist simply replac-
ing Platonic tyranny with yet another (albeit slower) pursuit of order, how 
we might skid along behind the agora and its related institutions, perhaps 
picking up and dwelling with those others who have been deemed witless 
alazons, unwitting eirons, imprudent students, or cretinous teachers—those 
who cannot, or prefer not to, or do not know how to keep up. It is in the 
detritus of orderly systems that we might catch up with the victims and 
followers of irony’s disorderly conduct.
burning down the house
There is irony and there is something else.
—Jacques Derrida, “Remarks”
Let me follow Kierkegaard in letting Aristophanes come after and compli-
cate Plato. Specifically, let us approach a loose ending by sticking our heads 
into Aristophanes’ Clouds. The play opens with the laments of Strepsiades, 
an “old bumpkin” whose son, Phidippides, has a passion for horse racing 
(1998, 11). That passion, Strepsiades gripes, has “infected [his] estate with 
the galloping trots” (15), leaving him “eaten alive by . . . bills and stable 
fees and debts” (11). Desperate, Strepsiades seeks to enroll his son in the 
“Thinkery” of Socrates. Socrates is here depicted as an inveterate “arch-
sophist” (Henderson 1998, 4) whose school is watched over by a chorus 
of apparently irreverent muses: the clouds (ll. 331–34). At the Thinkery, 
Strepsiades expects his son will receive a newfangled education allowing 
him to, à la Protagoras, make the weaker argument the stronger and thus to 
talk Strepsiades’ creditors out of collecting (ll. 94–99). Phidippides refuses, 
however, so dad enrolls instead. Socrates, who is gluing shoes on the feet 
of a flea when Strepsiades arrives (ll. 149–52), attempts to teach his new 
 student all manner of abstruse knowledge. Strepsiades seems an inept pupil, 
however: he is forgetful and distracted, tends to utter non sequiturs, and 
forces Socrates’ esoteric teachings into economic contexts. When Socrates 
asks whether he would prefer to learn “measures, or rhythms, or words” (91), 
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for instance, Strepsiades replies, “I’ll take the measures: the other day a corn 
dealer shorted me two quarts” (91). After using sophistic logic to take his 
cloak and turn him into an atheist, Socrates eventually expels the hopelessly 
exasperating Strepsiades, who cannot seem to retain what he’s supposed to 
have learned about grammar and declension (ll. 787–90)—though he does 
display a momentary knack for dodging lawsuits (ll. 769–73).
But Strepsiades subsequently convinces Phidippides to enroll in the 
Thinkery instead and persuades Socrates to admit his son (ll. 866–87). 
A contest between personified versions of conservative Stronger Argument 
and fashionable Weaker Argument ends with Stronger defeated, and so 
Strepsiades leaves his son in Weaker’s pedagogical care (1105–10). When 
Phidippides returns from his studies, he provides his father with some newly 
strengthened weaker arguments he can use against the family’s creditors 
(1170–1213). Strepsiades manages to run off two creditors—whether he “per-
suades” them seems doubtful—by deploying wildly incoherent and wayward 
reiterations of Socrates’ and his son’s arguments. He drives the first away, for 
instance, by returning to Socrates’ lessons on the declension of nouns, claim-
ing he “wouldn’t repay a single penny to anyone who calls a morté a mortar” 
(175). After that, however, the scheme backfires, with Phidippides making and 
acting on arguments in favor of children beating their parents (ll. 1332–1475). 
A scarified Strepsiades heads to the Thinkery and, in an act of destruction 
that ends the play, sets it on fire. As Socrates and his pupils suffocate and 
burn, Strepsiades justifies his actions, claiming, “They’ve got it coming many 
times over, but most of all for wronging the gods” (209).
As Ian C. Storey points out, Clouds is something of an oddity 
among Aristophanes’ works. Its “‘down’ ending” stands in contrast to his 
other plays, which usually wrap up with “general rejoicing” (1998a, xxxi). 
Strepsiades himself is also an outlier: in some ways, he does fit the mold 
of Aristophanes’ typical “comic hero, the old countryman who achieves his 
great idea and comes out on top” (Storey 1998b, 3). But, pointing to the 
scene in which Socrates attempts and apparently fails to teach Strepsiades, 
Storey notes that
the scene depends on stretching the spectator’s reactions in two 
opposite directions: he wants to be a sophos like Socrates, for 
(unlike Strepsiades) he knows about measures and rhythms, and 
at the same time wants to see the sophos taken down a rung or 
two. We admire Strepsiades’ low cunning and desire not to pay his 
debts, but at the same time we wince at his essential dishonesty and 
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insistence at learning . . . [Weaker] Argument. It can be observed 
that the “great idea” is undone at the end, that . . . the play ends with 
destruction rather than jubilation and reconciliation. (1998b, 3–4)
He chalks this up to the fact that Clouds itself was a loser: after it came in 
third and last at the Dionysia of 423 BCE, Aristophanes revised it, mocking 
his tasteless spectators in an updated parabasis and—according to Storey’s 
speculations—giving the play a darker ending (1998b, 7). In other words, 
Strepsiades is not necessarily, unlike some of Aristophanes’ other “comic 
hero[es],” a common-sense alazon who gets the goat of a highfalutin eiron. 
He has his revenge on Socrates, but does not seem to have learned anything. 
Is his credibility, not to mention the credibility of the gods and/or Stronger 
Argument, purified in the flames of the burning Thinkery? An open question.
Given the account(ing) of irony I have pursued, perhaps Strepsiades is 
neither alazon nor eiron. Perhaps his role is—if I may say so—irony itself: 
He gets the first word in the play, interrupting all the other characters before 
they can begin to speak. He learns Socrates’ lessons but fragments them 
in wildly irrational ways that shatter Socrates’ educational and rhetorical 
protocols—ways that, to return to Ronell (2002), “give a sound beating to 
a language that closes in on itself ” (156). And in the end, the beaten and 
broken rube suddenly enacts the play’s final act of destruction, burning the 
house of thought and its questionable inhabitants to the ground. Irony 
proves uncontrollable, abusing its Socratic master rather than getting used 
in that master’s service. And so the unfigurable student gets the last word, 
which might be serious and might be a laugh, as well.
If, as rhetoricians, we were to imagine ourselves in the place of an 
Aristophanic Socrates, laid low by a hapless pupil previously dismissed as 
stupid, what (if anything) might we learn from irony’s violence? Perhaps 
we should have attuned ourselves to it earlier. Perhaps Socrates would have 
succeeded with Strepsiades if he had been more considerate of the latter’s 
backwoods speechifying rather than proclaiming, “To hell and be damned 
with you, you oblivious, moronic old coot!” (Aristophanes 1998, 115), if he 
had accepted the purported moron’s responses as inventive interruptions, 
as openings for further response rather than aberrations in need of fore-
closure. (After all, in other iterations of Socrates’ story, it is precisely his 
unwillingness or inability to respond in the proper key that gets him killed.) 
Perhaps he could have even made room for this intractable idiot alongside 
the Thinkery’s more facile pupils, opened a space for disorder—a topos for 
an atopos student—and thus saved the rest from going up in smoke along 
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with their teacher. At the very least, listening for Strepsiades might have 
allowed a cannier Socrates to hear his destruction coming, leaving time to 
clear everyone out before the Thinkery burned down.
Or perhaps we always expect the unexpected too late; perhaps irony’s 
unmasterable disaster is already “here. Where? There” (Derrida 1988, 21). 
Perhaps the most Socrates could have done was take action in the wake of a 
disaster that is “always already past” (Blanchot 1995, 1): following the lead of 
the historical Socrates’ accusers, he could have organized his surviving students 
and marched over to Strepsiades’ door, demanded recompense and declared 
himself Strepsiades’ new creditor or roasted Strepsiades to even the score.
In short, it may be that irony’s arrival never gives us the chance to be a 
good host, to extend hospitality. It renders us, rather, a pedagogical hostage, 
stuck following after it rather than leading it or using it to lead—thus inter-
rupting one etymological sense of “pedagogue,” the one who leads (“ago-
gos”) the child (“pais”). In terms of pedagogical authority, then, what I am 
after is a “Socratic irony” that is not used by a masterful Socratic figure to 
lead students into orderly anamnesis and a deferral of deliberative authority 
to the teacher, but that disorders and deauthorizes “teacher” and “student” 
alike. It is, then, a linguistic violence to be weathered by us all even as it 
leads us to question the limits of such categories as “us” and “all.”
All this may seem to have come entirely unglued from the pedagogical 
exigencies faced by twenty-first-century rhetoric teachers, so let me tie it 
to something more apparently concrete. In Teaching Community, writer and 
educator bell hooks (2003) recounts the following:
When the tragic events of 9/11 occurred it was as though, in 
just a few moments in time, all our work to end domination in 
all its forms, all our pedagogies of hope, were rendered mean-
ingless as much of the American public . . . responded with an 
outpouring of . . . patriarchal rage against terrorists defined as 
dark-skinned others. . . . Even though I could walk to the sites 
of the 9/11  tragedy, I was not able to speak about these events for 
some time because I had come face-to-face with the limits of 
what I know. . . . What I knew, the limits of my knowing, was 
defined by information in alternative mass media and by the 
boundaries of what I experienced, of all that I witnessed. That’s all 
I could account for. Anything more would have been interpreta-
tions of interpretations offered me by a media whose agenda I hold 
suspect. (9–10)
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Though hooks is specifically critiquing the rush to craft a  comprehensible, 
reactionary narrative in the wake of 9/11, I would like to trace out some 
broader implications in her narrative. The drive to fight fire with fire, 
whether in the interpretations hooks describes or in my hypothetical con-
tinuations of Clouds’ narrative, is a powerful one. It is in many ways an 
understandable response to events that shatter the limits of understanding: 
a refusal to admit and dwell with the fact that one has “come face-to-face 
with the limits” of knowledge, with a disaster we cannot simply experience 
or coherently account for. And it is here that I wonder about the interrup-
tive, humbling, humiliating possibilities of a Socratic irony that would not 
seek to dissemble, to play on “unknown knowns” and “unknown unknowns” 
in order to justify the authority of patriarchal figures and render students 
and the rest of the demos ignorant of or unable to take responsibility for 
the deliberative response called for in the wake of irony’s disasters. And 
this is not just about such obviously horrifying events as 9/11 or the many 
other devastating historical events that defy attempts to speak of, write 
about, or represent them. It is also, I would argue, about the hundreds of 
moments that test the limits of us, of students, and of “our” languages every 
day, even when they mercifully do not involve arsonists. Irony might arrive 
as a grammar “error” in a student paper that if responded to and not simply 
struck out reveals rhetorical possibilities we had yet to consider (Lu 1994). 
It might arrive as an interruptive comment in a class discussion that disfig-
ures our conceptions of students, ourselves, and educational decorum, but if 
left to ferment rather than being ejected from the realm of what is allowed 
could generate a moment of pedagogical hospitality—a welcoming of the 
Other’s expression that “means: to be taught” (Levinas 1969, 51). Perhaps.
Department of English
Middle Tennessee State University
notes
For their generous and incisive feedback on innumerable drafts of this piece, I am deeply 
grateful to Diane Davis, Kendall Gerdes, and Steven LeMieux. Any worthwhile utterance 
printed in the preceding pages is inextricably indebted to Steven’s and Kendall’s patience 
and intellect. Thanks also to the anonymous reviewers at Philosophy and Rhetoric for their 
insightful suggestions.
1. Postioning Socrates among the ranks of “rhetoric teachers” may strike readers as a 
questionable move. For the moment, I will just note that a number of texts have explored 
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Socrates’ sophistic tendencies and rhetorical impulses; see, for example, Colebrook 2004, 
30, Henderson 1998, 4, and Kennedy 1994, 20.
2. In addition to Libanius’s complaints, consider the numerous satiric depictions of 
Roman teachers of rhetoric (Lucian 1925; Petronius 1997).
3. To both avoid and risk falling into my own Platonism, let me pause to unpack 
my deployment of “Platonic” as an adjective that might itself be read as essentializing. 
“What is x?” questions “are” Platonic only insofar as Plato “is,” in our historical moment, 
generally interpreted as a philosopher who saw the essence or nature of an idea or concept 
as metaphysical and not delimited by historical, rhetorical, and/or hermeneutic variables 
and variations. Such a question is not essentially Platonic given that, at some point, Plato’s 
dialogues might be interpreted—however oddly—as nonessentialist and not purely meta-
physical. As I preface this article’s encounter with the Gorgias, then, I do not mean to sug-
gest that Socrates (Plato’s or otherwise) is an essentialist or idealist. I have in mind, rather, 
extensive hermeneutic traditions that read Plato’s Socrates as such—traditions whose 
interpretive certitudes I hope to unsettle.
4. In some ways, my concerns about irony resonate with Christopher J. Gilbert’s 
(2013) concerns about satire. “Satire,” Gilbert states, “accommodates such a vast array of 
traits that I hesitate to redefine what it is, never mind what it does” (284). However, while 
Gilbert works to recover the “figure” of the “satyric” “in the interest of political humor,” 
I remain skeptical of anyone’s ability to simply take up irony—as “figure” or otherwise—
for political ends, though irony can certainly have consequences for politics (299).
5. The sort of ironic undecidability that I am tracking has been addressed at length 
by Blanchot, Ronell, and—perhaps most recognizably—Derrida. This article’s treatment 
might thus seem like a retread, redundant. My motive for retracing it here is to connect 
it with rhetoric pedagogy. Even among rhetoricians with a taste for Derridean undecid-
ability, that undecidability is often positioned as part and parcel of rhetorical theory, a 
conceptual or critical concern that unfolds in relative isolation from rhetoric’s pedagogical 
scene (see the anonymous colleague referenced in Walker 2011, 14–16). Though I do not 
wish to suggest there is a positive relationship between rhetoric pedagogy and ironic unde-
cidability, I do believe that they have things to say to each other and that they are perhaps 
saying things to each other already.
6. See David Wolfsdorf ’s consideration of “Plato’s intentions” as he works to define—
and basically cancel out—“Socratic irony” (2007, 181).
7. See note 3.
8. Given my concern with irony, I should note that Richard Rorty (1989) catego-
rizes Foucault as an “ironist”—more precisely, “an ironist who is unwilling to be a lib-
eral” (61). Rorty also includes Derrida, Heidegger, and Nietzsche in this category, which 
he aligns with the “private” side of a “public”/“private” binary that explicitly undergirds 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. For Derrida’s response to Rorty’s private/public distinc-
tion, see “Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism” (1996, 80–81). Given my article’s 
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place within what might be called a “tradition” of Derridean aberrations, I will not have 
much more to say about Rorty’s work on irony, though it is in many ways valuable (for 
more on Rorty’s relation to irony, see Stroud 2014, 306–9).
9. See the totalizing, unity-driven Platonism Paul Ramsey (2009) maps onto “ modern 
conservatives’ curricular agenda” (573).
10. I borrow the terms “alazon” and “eiron” from de Man, who in term borrowed them 
from Greek comedy. Here is de Man: “It helps a little to think of it [i.e., irony] in terms 
of the ironic man, in terms of the traditional opposition between eiron and alazon, as they 
appear in Greek or Hellenic comedy, the smart guy and the dumb guy. Most discourses 
about irony are set up that way, and this one will also be set up that way. You must then 
keep in mind that the smart guy, who is by necessity the speaker, always turns out to be the 
dumb guy, and that he’s always being set up by the person he thinks of as being the dumb 
guy, the alazon” (1996, 165).
11. In the context in which Plato’s using it, “eirōneuēi” is closer to “dissembling” or 
“feigning ignorance” than the more recent sense of “not saying what you mean,” though it 
is not entirely distinct from the latter. For all the glosses of Greek terms included in this 
article, I am significantly indebted to the patience and know-how of Jeffrey Walker.
12. That the authorship of this letter remains uncertain only further multiplies the 
possibilities outlined here.
13. For a different take on Latour’s broader corpus, and one that might justly call some 
of my characterizations of his work into question, see Santos 2015. Let me reiterate that 
I am particularly focused on Latour’s reading of the Gorgias and that some of his other 
writings share points of overlap with my own claims.
14. Latour quotes from Robin Waterfield’s (1994) translation of the Gorgias. Waterfield 
notes that the “experts” Socrates is speaking of are likely the Pythagoreans and some pre-
Socratics, whom Waterfield claims “perceived the universe as in some sense an ordered 
whole” (160). Zeyl, meanwhile, renders the same passage (507e–508a) as follows: “Yes, 
Callicles, wise men claim that partnership and friendship, orderliness, self-control, and 
justice hold together heaven and earth, and gods and men, and that is why they call the 
universe a world order, my friend, and not an undisciplined world-disorder” (Plato 1987, 88). 
Given Latour’s championing of this passage, Waterfield’s “ordered whole” certainly has a 
nicer ring than Zeyl’s ominously italicized “world order.”
15. Latour’s interest in “conditions of felicity” arguably precludes Derrida’s (1988) 
interest in “opportunit[ies] to transform infelicity into delight” (72, emphasis mine).
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